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On October 16, 2000, thirty-two weeks pregnant with twins, I sat in my 
office, preparing my lecture for the afternoon session of my 
undergraduate course entitled “Christian Ethics and Health Care.” I had 
taught this course every semester for six years. I was preparing my 
remarks on a chapter I had taught almost every semester, the first 
chapter of Margaret Morhmann’s short book, Medicine as Ministry.1 
Morhmann is a pediatric intensivist as well as a theologian-bioethicist 
who spent decades on faculty at the University of Virginia medical school, 
including an appointment in the Center for Biomedical Ethics and 
Humanities.
The first chapter of Medicine as Ministry is entitled “God Is One: The 
Temptations of Idolatry.” Here, Morhmann explores the relationship 
between a central claim of the monotheistic faiths—that God is One—and 
our choices, decisions, and actions in the clinical context. She lifts up the 
Shema of the Jewish tradition—“Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord 
is One!”—and the first commandment of the Judeo-Christian tradition: “I 
am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of 
the house of slavery; You shall have no other gods before me.”2 She 
 
Catholicism and the Neonatal Context
Page 2 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD MEDICINE ONLINE (www.oxfordmedicine.com). © Oxford 
University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Medicine Online for 
personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: UC - Irvine; date: 31 August 2020
explores whether the current structures of medicine honor these claims, 
or whether they instead embody a deep idolatry—a worship of the false 
gods of medical technology or health or life or, perhaps, of the demiurge, 
death.3 In support of her challenge, she quotes Mother Teresa, 
elaborating on an observation the saint once made upon visiting a 
neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) in the United States:
Mother Teresa, for one, has called the neonatal intensive care units 
that populate American hospitals “obscene”; she could as easily 
have called them “blasphemous.”4
I took great pleasure in teaching this passage because undergraduates of 
all stripes generally love Mother Teresa. Consequently, they are quite 
taken aback to hear her criticize something that seems, on its face, to be 
so good—neonatal medicine. That afternoon, I was ready yet again to hit 
them with this challenge, to shake up their given conceptual frameworks, 
and to demonstrate how theology can destabilize taken-for-granted 
assumptions and open up new as-yet-unasked questions.
I never made it to class. Twenty-four hours later, I found myself sitting 
between two isolettes in the NICU of Kettering Medical Center—a 
hospital in the Seventh-day Adventist tradition—isolettes that housed my 
two newly born, two-month-premature babies. Like most parents of 
preemies, I had never expected my babies to arrive early. I had never 
expected to be whisked into the high-tech world of neonatal medicine, to 
sit on the sidelines while others monitored and managed a dizzying array 
of my children’s bodily functions and overall well-being, to be consulted 
on a daily basis as the de jure decision maker, rubber-stamping in my 
hormone-bathed mental state the daily recommendations of the truly 
outstanding neonatal care team.
But, unlike most parents of preemies, I sat amid this whirlwind not only 
as a mother but also as a Catholic moral theologian and medical ethicist. I 
had taught cases akin to many that populated the other isolettes around 
me. I knew well the principles that applied—both the principles of 
biomedical ethics and the principles of the Catholic moral tradition. And 
as I sat there day after day for almost a month, I found myself saying a 
number of times: “Mother Teresa says this is obscene. Margaret 
Mohrmann suggests it might be blasphemous.”
Needless to say, it was a rather surreal experience to be a Catholic 
theologian, a medical ethicist, and the mother of premature twins all in 
the same moment. It was akin to being both a vulnerable refugee in a 
strange country where one neither speaks the language nor knows the 
customs and being an anthropologist among the natives or an embedded 
journalist, all at the same time. My brain oscillated between the 
biologically driven compulsion to do everything so that my children would 
survive—all the while analyzing, observing, documenting, critiquing.
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After the children came home, the anthropologist was put on the 
backburner. There were more pressing things to deal with than the 
practical, theological, and ethical dynamics of the NICU. My reflections in 
this chapter mark the first time I have written about neonatal medicine 
since that unexpected immersion experience. In what follows, I leave 
most of my anthropological insights to the side. Yet, my NICU experience 
as a mother-theologian-scholar inevitably lies in the background 
whenever I approach these questions. And, while sharing many 
commonalities, this experience was not like that of all NICU parents: 
apart from being born at thirty-two weeks, my children were never really 
in any grave peril, at least as far as we knew. True, my son was not 
breathing and may not have had a heartbeat when he was born, but the 
excellent staff remedied that rather quickly. My daughter had a 
pneumothorax, but it resolved itself within 24 hours. The children were 
small but not tiny—1,640 and 1,950 grams, respectively—chubby babies 
by NICU standards. They mostly needed to learn how to eat and fatten up 
so that they could self-regulate their body temperatures. My daughter 
eventually needed an apnea monitor, but truth be told, it made those first 
months of parenting easier. They stayed at the hospital for roughly three 
weeks. And they have no developmental or other sorts of disabilities. 
They are healthy, athletic, smart, and flourishing. Thus, our experience 
was neither one of critical ethical dilemmas nor negative sequelae.
Catholicism and Neonatal Medicine: Contours and 
Complexities
In this chapter, I have been asked to focus on one very specific topic: 
Catholicism in the neonatal context. As the editors of this volume have 
noted, currently, there is little or no literature available within the 
discipline of biomedical ethics to assist neonatal caregivers in 
understanding how religious beliefs and values might influence parents’ 
responses to the challenges posed by their newborn’s care.5 Equally, 
there is little or no literature available within the disciplines of academic 
or pastoral theology addressing questions of neonatal medicine. My 
contribution here seeks to address the question: in what ways might the 
teachings and religious practices of the Roman Catholic tradition inform 
the ways in which parents and caregivers make treatment decisions about 
the high-risk newborn infant?
Let me begin by providing some background on Catholicism in the United 
States. For decades, Catholics have comprised approximately 22% of the 
US population, with approximately seventy million Catholics living in the 
United States today.6 This makes Roman Catholicism the largest single 
religious denomination in the United States. Although Catholic presence 
varies geographically, a sizeable proportion of the patient census in most 
hospitals will likely be Catholic. The growing edge of the Roman Catholic 
Church in the United States is the Hispanic or Latino Catholic population; 
as of February 2013, nearly half of Catholics in the United States younger 
than forty years were Hispanic (46%). This cohort is of childbearing age. 
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Given ongoing issues of access to health care (even with the Affordable 
Care Act), compounded by immigration politics and the socioeconomics of 
race, many women in this cohort will continue to receive inadequate 
prenatal care, resulting in potentially higher rates of prematurity and 
other issues that will land them and their babies in the NICU.
Thus, a significant number of Catholics make their way through the doors 
of the NICU in the United States. On simply a percentage basis, roughly 
125,000 premature babies born each year in the United States will have a 
Catholic parent. Yet, simply because a patient or family identifies with a 
particular religious tradition does not mean that the teachings, beliefs, 
and practices of that tradition necessarily influence their actions and 
decisions or influence the actions and decisions of all members of a 
tradition in the same way. There is a preponderance of Catholics in the 
United States, but the ways in which these seventy million people inhabit 
Catholicism certainly vary.
Immigrants and foreign visitors aside, American Catholics—just like most 
of the rest of the people who walk into the clinical setting—are often 
more deeply formed and informed by the traditions of US culture, their 
profession, and their socioeconomic class than by their faith tradition. For 
example, while civil divorce is generally considered a grave, morally illicit 
offense per Catholic teaching,7 divorce rates among Catholics are lower 
than other groups in the United States, but not by an overwhelming 
margin.8 Catholics cite lower rates of abortion than their Protestant 
counterparts in the United States, reflecting the Catholic Church’s 
opposition to abortion, but again not by a large margin.9 Pew Research in 
2013 found that roughly 50% of Catholics support both same-sex 
marriage and keeping abortion legal.10
Like many long-lived religious traditions, one finds a spectrum of 
adherence. Roughly 40% of Catholics attend Mass on a weekly basis; 17% 
go “seldom or never,” with the remaining 43% all over the map.11 Various 
groups adhere strongly to one part of the tradition or another. There are 
the visibly evangelical Catholics who identify with the Church’s teachings 
on marriage and life so much so that we used to be able to say they were 
“right of the Pope.” There are the social justice Catholics who are 
passionate about the Church’s social justice tradition but have no time or 
patience for the Church’s teachings on marriage and sexuality. There is a 
sizeable middle ground who are deeply faithful in practice and who do 
their best to hold both of these poles together. There are those who pray 
the rosary and believe in Marian apparitions; there are those who join the 
Maryknolls and do mission work in Central and South America. Then add 
the immigrant populations, where Catholic belief and practice have been 
interwoven for centuries with particular cultural traditions, and it gets 
very complex. Or, as we often say, Catholicism is a Big Tent.
Yet, Catholicism does present one decided advantage over many other 
religious traditions: Catholicism has developed an authoritative body of 
literature on key questions related to medicine and health care to which 
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clinicians, the faithful, and others can turn for (relatively) clear guidance. 
In addition to a two-thousand-year tradition of saints, theologians, and 
developing wisdom, Catholics have a century’s worth of papal encyclicals, 
apostolic exhortations, pastoral letters, and other documents issued by 
authoritative persons or bodies to which we can refer to try to clarify 
what the Church actually teaches on a given topic.
For the purposes of this chapter, I will draw largely from one very short 
document, The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services.12 The ERDs, as they are often called, distill in pamphlet form 
basic convictions of the Catholic tradition and a set of directives or 
guidelines that provide the parameters for the ethical practice of 
medicine within Catholic healthcare institutions. The ERDs are designed 
to be a resource for all who work in Catholic health care as well as for 
patients and families who wish to make decisions consistent with their 
Catholic faith while situated in other-than-Catholic healthcare contexts.
Additionally, over the past two millennia, Catholicism has developed a 
rich and extensive set of liturgical traditions that are deeply inhabited by 
most Catholics. Sacramental practices, augmented by artifacts of material 
culture (such as images of Our Lady of Guadalupe for Latino/a Catholics 
or the Sacred Heart of Jesus for Catholics of European descent), are 
critical resources for many Catholics in times of illness, discernment, and 
death. When faced with a medical crisis, even Catholics who seldom 
attend Mass—or who may not have set foot in a church for decades—will 
instinctively turn to the sacraments and rites of the Church for comfort, 
for strength, for tradition, or for reasons unknown even to them.
Thus, demographically, “Catholicism” is not a monolithic entity but, 
rather, provides a complex and varied landscape; theologically and 
liturgically, Catholicism is a richly contoured tradition that provides a 
multiplicity of resources for patients, families, and caregivers to draw on. 
In the NICU, this complex and contoured religious tradition meets an 
equally multifaceted clinical reality. Neonatal cases vary widely. Charles 
Camosy, in his book, Too Expensive to Treat? Finitude, Tragedy, and the 
Neonatal ICU, helpfully groups neonatal patients into four categories:
• Full-term babies with acute illnesses
• Babies with congenital anomalies
• Babies with prematurity
• Babies with extreme prematurity
The types of issues encountered with neonatal patients may vary from 
category to category. While it would be most useful to examine how the 
Roman Catholic tradition might be applied to specific cases in the 
previous categories, in what follows, I will primarily provide an overview 
of the teachings and practices of the Roman Catholic tradition that are 
broadly applicable across categories. Ideally, readers of this volume could 
meet together with their pastoral care and ethics staff to explore how 
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these teachings and practices might illuminate specific cases they have 
encountered in their own clinical contexts.
Roman Catholic Principles in the Neonatal 
Setting
For caregivers working with Catholic parents and decision makers in the 
neonatal setting, seven fundamental convictions or areas of teaching of 
the Roman Catholic tradition would be most relevant: (1) understandings 
of the moral and religious status of the premature infant or newborn; (2) 
teaching on patient decision making; (3) guidelines regarding withholding 
and withdrawing treatment; (4) developments with regard to medically 
assisted nutrition and hydration; (5) teaching on the care and treatment 
of conditions considered incompatible with life; (6) advocacy of palliative 
care; and (7) teaching on the care of dead bodies, including burial, 
autopsy, and organ donation.
The Dignity of the Human Person
Despite the variety of ways Catholics inhabit their tradition, it is safe to 
say that most Catholics are grasped by a deep, almost embodied 
commitment to the value of human life and the dignity of the human 
person.13 This conviction will be an operative factor in the discernment 
process of many Catholic parents. Especially with the papacy of John Paul 
II, this unwavering commitment to the dignity of the human person and 
the sanctity of human life gained a new visibility. For the ERDs, it is the 
foundational principle.
First, Catholic healthcare ministry is rooted in a commitment to promote 
and defend human dignity; this is the foundation of its concern to respect 
the sacredness of every human life from the moment of conception until 
death. The first right of the human person, the right to life, entails a right 
to the means for the proper development of life, such as adequate health 
care.14
Within Catholicism, there is a spectrum of adherence to this conviction. 
At one end are the vitalists, who insist on maintaining human biological 
life under any and all conditions, at any and all costs (a position not 
exclusive to Catholicism, by the way). As we will see later, the Catholic 
tradition is not vitalist, but there are self-identified Catholics who inhabit 
this position. At the other end of the spectrum are those, such as 
Catholics for Choice (formerly known as Catholics for Free Choice), who 
engage in advocacy efforts to advance access to safe and legal abortion 
services.15
Most Catholics inhabit a middle ground—they see human life as a holy 
thing, a unique image of God, and see each living person as having 
inherent dignity and worth regardless of social location, disability, age, 
health status, and so on. Importantly, the Catholic tradition does not 
define “personhood” as consisting in certain capacities or even potential 
for capacities, as is often the case in secular bioethics. From the moment 
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of conception until “natural death,” each and every human being is 
considered to be a person, a creature of God, someone loved by God and 
therefore to be loved by us, regardless of their social utility, the costs of 
their care, how “disabled” they might be, or what potential for such 
disability there might be.16 In fact, there is a sense in the Catholic 
tradition that the more vulnerable a person is, the greater the obligation 
to treat them with respect and dignity.
Most parents—Catholic or not—understand their neonate to be not only a 
baby but also a person.17 This perspective will shape the ways in which 
they care for their infant as well as the decisions they make about 
treatment options. They will generally expect hospital staff to do the 
same, regardless of their baby’s condition. It is encouraging to see the 
evolution of language used with regard to neonatal patients, at least 
within the field of bioethics. No longer discussed under the heading of 
“handicapped newborns” or “defective neonates,” the language has 
shifted to “the high-risk neonatal patient.” This change in language 
signals a conceptual advance that sees the child not primarily as defective 
but, rather, hopefully, as a patient with inherent dignity and worth. In all 
interactions with neonatal patients and their families, the Catholic 
tradition would encourage all caregivers to envisage and treat neonates 
as unique persons of value and to support parents as they do the same.
Patient Decision Making in Catholic Perspective
How do or ought religious beliefs factor into patient decision making from 
a Catholic perspective? Some, at times, wish to draw a dichotomy 
between “autonomy” and “heteronomy” in moral decision making. A 
Catholic perspective would challenge drawing this distinction too sharply. 
Contra Kant, all morality really is heteronomous. It is a rare (or perhaps 
nonexistent) moral principle or moral framework that a person can make 
up oneself. With few exceptions, we all adopt moral principles from 
“outside” ourselves. Consider the principle of utility, for example—John 
Stuart Mill coined this one, and most of us have imbibed it as an eternal 
truth from our culture. It often possesses a power over us that is difficult 
to resist. So it is with all moral principles. Especially because morality 
inherently has a social function, all morality is heteronomous. Thus, 
patient decision making across traditions is much more nuanced than 
either heteronomy or autonomy—and therefore more complicated and 
messy.
The ERDs understand the patient–physician relationship—and therefore 
the decision-making process—to be a collaborative endeavor. The Bishops 
open Part Three of the ERDs, entitled “The Professional-Patient 
Relationship,” with a rich account of this mutual collaboration:
A person in need of health care and the professional health care 
provider who accepts that person as a patient enter into a 
relationship that requires, among other things, mutual respect, 
trust, honesty, and appropriate confidentiality. The resulting free 
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exchange of information must avoid manipulation, intimidation, or 
condescension. Such a relationship enables the patient to disclose 
personal information needed for effective care and permits the 
health care provider to use his or her professional competence most 
effectively to maintain or restore the patient’s health. Neither the 
health care professional nor the patient acts independently of the 
other; both participate in the healing process.18
It is within this shared context that the Catholic tradition locates the 
centrality of voluntary, informed patient decision-making. As the ERDs 
note:
Free and informed consent requires that the person or the person’s 
surrogate receive all reasonable information about the essential 
nature of the proposed treatment and its benefits; its risks, side- 
effects, consequences, and cost; and any reasonable and morally 
legitimate alternatives, including no treatment at all.
Each person or the person’s surrogate should have access to 
medical and moral information and counseling so as to be able to 
form his or her conscience.19
What we hear here is that patients—or, in the neonatal context, patients’ 
families—are charged with the task of making informed decisions. These 
decisions should be informed by a variety of sources. The medical facts 
and economic realities are first and foremost. In deciding whether to 
pursue a particular treatment, parents are enjoined to take into 
consideration “its benefits; its risks, side-effects, consequences, and 
cost.” Health care professionals are enjoined to provide this information 
to parents in a way they can understand and in a nonbiased manner.
This empirical information enters into the ongoing process of formation of 
conscience. Conscience is considered almost sacrosanct within the 
Catholic tradition. It is that central human intellectual and moral faculty 
that interprets and reasons through particular situations in light of moral 
principles. In the words of the Second Vatican Council, “Conscience is the 
most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, 
Whose voice echoes in his depths.”20 One’s conscience must be formed 
well in order to function well. Ideally, conscience is formed on an ongoing 
basis by information, prayer, and consultation with others—family, 
friends, healthcare professionals, and clergy. Relevant information 
includes medical and economic information as well as familial and social 
commitments and Church teachings.
Thus, religious beliefs should enter into parental decision making in the 
neonatal context as one component of a careful process of reasoned 
discernment, or perhaps as an integrative framework that helps structure 
how the various components are related to each other. Such a decision- 
making process is far from formulaic. While communal and collaborative, 
the ultimate decision is finally the province of the patient or, in this case, 
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the patient’s parents. In this way, the Catholic respect for the dignity of 
the human person translates into a respect for conscience, productively 
integrating what might otherwise be construed as autonomy and 
heteronomy.21
Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment
Most Catholics are quite familiar with the Church’s teaching on the 
dignity of the human person and conscience. Many, however, are not 
aware of the Church’s teaching on withholding and withdrawing 
treatment; many others misunderstand it. Against those who take a 
vitalist position, Directive 28 makes clear that a viable treatment option 
may be “no treatment at all.”
The Catholic tradition on withholding and withdrawing treatment is a 
clear, nuanced, well-established, five-hundred-year old position. It is 
summed up succinctly in the ERDs:
A person has a moral obligation to use ordinary or proportionate 
means of preserving his or her life. Proportionate means are those 
that in the judgment of the patient offer a reasonable hope of 
benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose excessive 
expense on the family or the community.
A person may forgo extraordinary or disproportionate means of 
preserving life. Disproportionate means are those that in the 
patient’s judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit or 
entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense on the 
family or the community.22
These two Directives succinctly capture key convictions:
• Human life is a fundamental good—a gift, a holy thing! If it can be 
saved or prolonged using reasonable means, one has a moral 
obligation to do so.
• The locus of decision making is, again, the patient, or in the neonatal 
context, the parents.
• “Benefit,” notably, is not defined; it is not limited to a “reasonable 
hope of extending biological life.” What constitutes “benefit” is left to 
the judgment of the patient; the assessment of benefit must be 
reasonable, but the Directives make clear that benefit is determined 
relative to the medical condition and conscience of the patient.
• Likewise, “burden” is not defined. It must simply not be excessive, 
and reasons should be given for that judgment.
• Expense to the patient’s family or community may legitimately be 
taken into account, even rendering an “ordinary” means 
“extraordinary.”
• Human persons are finite; death is an inevitable reality for all.
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• And last, medical treatments may be declined or removed. Not all 
“means of preserving life” are morally obligatory.
Within this framework, those interventions that offer a reasonable hope of 
benefit and reasonable burden and cost are always obligatory. One should 
always pursue the good if one can, within reason. But note the 
conjunctions in the directives. One has no obligation to pursue treatments 
if one of the conditions does not obtain: if there is not a reasonable hope 
of benefit; or if the burdens would be excessive; or if the intervention 
would impose excessive expense on the family or community.
Benefit and burden have long been understood broadly in the Catholic 
tradition. A patient is permitted to take into account psychological, social, 
spiritual, familial, and financial dimensions of any treatment protocol. 
Pope Pius XII clarified two additional nuances in 1957, noting:
But normally one is held to use only ordinary means—according to 
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture—that is to say, 
means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. 
A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men 
and would render the attainment of the higher, more important 
goods too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact 
subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one is not 
forbidden to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve 
life and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious 
duty. . . . On the other hand, since these forms of treatment go 
beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held 
that there is an obligation to use them nor, consequently, that one is 
bound to give the doctor permission to use them.23
Per the Pontiff, a medical means is not ordinary or extraordinary in and of 
itself; that determination is based in part on the patient’s overall 
circumstances. And, in keeping with the Thomistic tradition of 
Catholicism, Pius identifies a hierarchy of goods, with the physical goods 
of health and even life being subordinated to—and “ordered to”—the 
pursuit of spiritual ends.
Human life is a great and wonderful good—sacred, sanctified, with 
inherent dignity. It is to be loved, respected, protected, and promoted. 
But it is not an absolute.24 As natural death draws near, it is not 
obligatory to prolong biological life at all (or even significant) costs. As 
the Vatican noted in its 1980 Declaration on Euthanasia, refusal of 
disproportionate treatment “is not the equivalent of suicide” but rather 
“should be considered an acceptance of the human condition.”25 This 
document affirms that patients may withhold or withdraw certain forms 
of medical treatment that “would only secure a precarious and 
burdensome prolongation of life.” The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
suggests that to fight death “at all costs” may in fact be morally 
problematic:
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Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, dangerous, 
extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be 
legitimate; it is the refusal of “over-zealous” treatment. Here one 
does not will to cause death; one’s inability to impede it is merely 
accepted. The decisions should be made by the patient if he is 
competent and able or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the 
patient, whose reasonable will and legitimate interests must always 
be respected.26
The Catechism here highlights one of the points of tension within the 
application of Catholic teaching on withholding and withdrawing 
treatment. For the teaching, as it developed over most of its five-hundred- 
year history, presumed the patient would be the one making the 
calculation about burdens and benefits relative to herself or himself. For 
most of this five-hundred-year history, there were few decisions to be 
made by families about patients. Over the past forty years—and 
particularly in the neonatal setting—this has changed dramatically. And 
this is where it becomes the most difficult. It is one thing for a patient to 
decline a course of treatment because it may impose excessive expense 
on his family; how can a surrogate make that same decision without 
devaluing the life of the neonate because he or she is disabled or 
expensive or inconvenient?
Thus, in practice, in the neonatal setting, definitions of benefit and 
burden have necessarily narrowed somewhat. In all instances, the 
Catholic tradition holds, “those whose lives are diminished or weakened 
deserve special respect. Sick or handicapped persons should be helped to 
lead lives as normal as possible.”27 Thus, if a medical intervention can 
help move a child toward a reasonable level of functioning—even with 
disability, expense, and ongoing medical support—that intervention may 
well be ordinary and obligatory. If a medical intervention promises little 
benefit in terms of advancing function or would impose an excessive 
burden on the patient or is proving excessively expensive to the family, 
then it may well be extraordinary and not required.
Such evaluations must be made by parents in collaborative consultation 
with the medical staff, family, friends, and perhaps even clergy based on 
the good of the patient and the patient’s best interests. But the good of 
the child and the good of the parents are deeply intertwined. We see this 
acknowledged, again, by Pius XII in his address cited earlier, where he 
comments on the morality of discontinuing resuscitation:
The rights and duties of the family [with regard to decision-making] 
depend in general upon the presumed will of the unconscious 
patient if he is of age and sui juris. Where the proper and 
independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually bound 
only to the use of ordinary means . . . . Consequently, if it appears 
that the attempt at resuscitation constitutes in reality such a 
burden for the family that one cannot in all conscience impose it 
upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor should 
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discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply. 
There is not involved here a case of direct disposal of the life of the 
patient, nor of euthanasia in any way: this would never be licit. 
Even when it causes the arrest of circulation, the interruption of 
attempts at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of 
the cessation of life, and one must apply in this case the principle of 
double effect and of “voluntarium in causa.”
While Catholic teaching on withholding and withdrawing treatment does 
not mandate extraordinary treatment, it also does not prohibit it. Parents 
may validly choose for their children what others may consider to be 
extraordinary treatments. While futile or vitalist interventions are 
discouraged by the Catholic tradition, caring for the disabled may be 
understood as a powerful form of witness. Families who choose to care 
for children with significant health issues ought to be supported by the 
communities in which they are located.
Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration
Few are not aware of the battles that have raged within the Catholic 
tradition over the past fifteen years around the question of medically 
assisted nutrition and hydration (MANH). For the most part, the 
argument has focused on patients in persistent vegetative state.28 How 
might Church teaching on MANH apply to the neonatal context?
Until 2009, Catholic teaching on MANH generally followed the overall 
guidelines for withholding and withdrawing treatment outlined 
previously. But, subsequent to the Terri Schiavo case, and a brief address 
by Pope John Paul II to a conference on “Life Sustaining Treatments and 
the Vegetative State” held at the Vatican in 2004, the issue of MANH has 
become more contested. In this address, John Paul II stated:
I should like particularly to underline how the administration of 
water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always 
represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its 
use, furthermore, should be considered, in principle, ordinary and 
proportionate, and as such morally obligatory, insofar as and until it 
is seen to have attained its proper finality, which in the present case 
consists in providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of 
his suffering.29
Some were concerned that in seeming to name a particular medical 
intervention as ordinary and proportionate in all situations, John Paul II 
was contradicting five hundred years of Catholic tradition. Yet, a more 
careful reading of the statement in context allays concerns. Importantly, 
the document applies only to patients in persistent vegetative states. To 
take this passage out of context and apply it to all patients would be a 
misinterpretation of the document.
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At issue is the normal care due to the sick; Catholic teaching is clear that 
one must never abandon care for a seriously ill or dying patient. In many 
cases, the initiation of MANH in patients in crisis is the standard of 
practice; it is a standard intervention in the neonatal setting, usually 
intended as a short-term intervention designed to bridge neonates to the 
point at which they can develop the sucking reflex and coordinate sucking 
and swallowing (approximately thirty-four weeks’ gestational age). For 
some impaired newborns, however, MANH becomes permanent. For 
severely impaired newborns, or those whose medical issues become 
critical before thirty-four weeks, questions may be raised about 
discontinuing tube feeding.
Directive 58 of the ERDs provides the parameters for addressing such 
situations. As the Bishops note:
In principle, there is an obligation to provide patients with food and 
water, including medically assisted nutrition and hydration for 
those who cannot take food orally. This obligation extends to 
patients in chronic and presumably irreversible conditions (e.g., the 
“persistent vegetative state”) who can reasonably be expected to 
live indefinitely if given such care. Medically assisted nutrition and 
hydration become morally optional when they cannot reasonably be 
expected to prolong life or when they would be “excessively 
burdensome for the patient or [would] cause significant physical 
discomfort, for example resulting from complications in the use of 
the means employed.” For instance, as a patient draws close to 
inevitable death from an underlying progressive and fatal condition, 
certain measures to provide nutrition and hydration may become 
excessively burdensome and therefore not obligatory in light of 
their very limited ability to prolong life or provide comfort.30
The Directive sets the question within the fundamental context, namely, 
that (in the words of the Catechism), “those whose lives are diminished or 
weakened deserve special respect. Sick or handicapped persons should 
be helped to lead lives as normal as possible.”31 In most situations, the 
administration of nutrition and hydration—either through traditional 
means or medically assisted—provides reasonable benefit with reasonable 
burden; in most situations it is ordinary and therefore obligatory. But 
circumstances can change. The same intervention that initially was 
ordinary may, because of the changing situation of the patient, become 
“morally optional” or extraordinary. If MANH—alone or in conjunction 
other interventions—becomes, in the estimation of the parents, 
excessively burdensome for the patient, or if the usual battery of medical 
interventions does little more than impede death, MANH may become 
morally optional.
Fundamentally, the main question is: what is the purpose or aim of the 
withdrawal of MANH or any other intervention? Is the treatment being 
removed because it is not effective or because it is imposing an excessive 
burden on the patient? Or is it being removed in order that the patient 
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will die? At issue here is the intention and the real goal or end. The 
Catholic tradition retains a commitment to the distinction between 
allowing death to come versus deciding for death (a.k.a., euthanasia, 
assisted suicide). Euthanasia, as defined by the Catholic tradition, is “an 
action or an omission which of itself or by intention causes death, in order 
that all suffering may in this way be eliminated.”32 In other words, it is 
legitimate to withdraw treatment if there is a problem with the treatment 
(insufficient benefit, excessive burden); it is not legitimate to withdraw 
treatment because there is a problem with the patient (impairment or 
suffering). It is legitimate not to fight death at all costs; it is not 
legitimate to bring death forward.
At work here are two aspects of the Catholic tradition often obscured by 
our culture. The first is that the Catholic moral tradition is more one of 
character than of consequences. The Catholic moral tradition has for 
centuries forwarded a virtue ethic, an ethic that evaluates actions based 
not only on their outcomes or consequences on others or in the world but 
equally based on their effect on the character of the agent. Premised on a 
complex account of human moral psychology, all actions are understood 
to have a reciprocal effect on the person who commits them. All actions 
we commit are understood to shape us—our wills, our dispositions, our 
bodies, the interpretive lens through which we view the world—in 
particular directions, toward or away from certain fundamental goods. In 
doing so, each action trains us more easily to commit similar actions in 
the future. The more I commit a particular action, the more it becomes a 
habit.
This character or virtue framework informs Catholic teaching on end-of- 
life care. A key question is: how will a particular end-of-life action affect 
the character of the decision maker? Acts of euthanasia, where an agent 
actively pursues or brings forward death (an end that diminishes human 
flourishing), are understood to habituate that person to more easily carry 
out further acts of killing. They habituate and reinforce certain character 
traits—efficiency, expediency, control—that may be at odds with 
fundamental Christian virtues. Allowing a patient to die, when death is 
imminent, however, is understood to aim toward a different goal and 
inculcate a different set of virtues. To accept death’s imminence is not to 
aim toward or to seek death; it is, rather, to simply acknowledge an 
inescapable part of reality. To allow death to come often requires actions 
that inculcate the virtues of patience (death often will not be hurried or 
work on our own timetable), of charity (the gift of self offered by being 
present to the patient through attention and caregiving), of hospitality 
(welcoming the patient despite his or her anomalies or impairments), or 
of prudence (as one constantly evaluates care options in the face of the 
patient’s demise).
Thus, actions and decisions in the neonatal context ought (from a Catholic 
perspective) to be evaluated in part relative to the effects of those actions 
on the character of medical staff and parents. The Catholic tradition also 
challenges those in the neonatal context to evaluate the lens through 
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which they perceive imperiled patients. It pushes back against what has 
often been perceived as a subtle but advancing cultural lens that values 
efficiency, economics, and control over the lives of human persons. This 
mindset is at times referred to as the “culture of death.” Pope John Paul II 
in his 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae describes this mindset as:
. . . a veritable structure of sin. This reality is characterized by the 
emergence of a culture which denies solidarity and in many cases 
takes the form of a veritable “culture of death.” This culture is 
actively fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political 
currents which encourage an idea of society excessively concerned 
with efficiency. Looking at the situation from this point of view, it is 
possible to speak in a certain sense of a war of the powerful against 
the weak: a life which would require greater acceptance, love and 
care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden, and 
is therefore rejected in one way or another. A person who, because 
of illness, handicap or, more simply, just by existing, compromises 
the well-being or life-style of those who are more favoured tends to 
be looked upon as an enemy to be resisted or eliminated. In this 
way a kind of “conspiracy against life” is unleashed.33
While it is true that the taking of life not yet born or in its final stages is 
sometimes marked by a mistaken sense of altruism and human 
compassion, it cannot be denied that such a culture of death, taken as a 
whole, betrays an individualistic concept of freedom, which ends up by 
becoming the freedom of “the strong” against the weak, who have no 
choice but to submit.34
For John Paul II, the culture of death is a subtle force, driven by powerful 
yet often invisible economic factors and masked by “a mistaken sense of 
compassion,” which justifies eliminating persons with illness and 
disabilities. Persons with disability complicate society’s drive toward 
ever-greater efficiency, productivity, and economic growth. Yet, within a 
Catholic perspective, our personhood—the personhood of the strong— 
calls us toward a greater solidarity with those who are vulnerable, poor, 
weak, and in need. As the ERDs note,
Catholic health care should distinguish itself by service to and 
advocacy for those people whose social condition puts them at the 
margins of our society and makes them particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination. . . . In particular, the person with mental or physical 
disabilities, regardless of the cause or severity, must be treated as a 
unique person of incomparable worth, with the same right to life 
and to adequate health care as all other persons.35
Neonatal medicine is one of the first instances of this solidarity in the 
lives of most high-risk infants.
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Persons or Conditions? Conditions “Incompatible with Life”
Catholic teaching and theologians have rarely addressed questions of 
infants with conditions deemed “incompatible with life,” presuming that 
the principles outlined earlier are sufficient. However, questions 
surrounding the treatment of anencephalic fetuses have been disputed 
within the Catholic tradition for at least the past thirty years.36 The main 
areas of disagreement have primarily concerned prenatal interventions— 
namely, is it morally licit to terminate a pregnancy once a diagnosis of 
anencephaly is made?
The US Catholic Bishops weighed in definitively on this question in 1996 
with their statement, “Moral Principles Concerning Infants with 
Anencephaly.”37 Reaffirming the dignity and personhood of anencephalic 
fetuses, they concluded that:
It is clear that before “viability” it is never permitted to terminate 
the gestation of an anencephalic child as the means of avoiding 
psychological or physical risks to the mother. Nor is such 
termination permitted after “viability” if early delivery endangers 
the child’s life due to complications of prematurity. . . . Only if the 
complications of the pregnancy result in a life-threatening 
pathology of the mother, may the treatment of this pathology be 
permitted even at a risk to the child, and then only if the child’s 
death is not a means to treating the mother.
Yet, the Bishops are not vitalists. They do not argue that, postpartum, all 
efforts to extend the biological life of anencephalic infants ought to be 
employed. Rather, they affirm the practice of solidarity as noted 
previously:
The anencephalic child during his or her probably brief life after 
birth should be given the comfort and palliative care appropriate to 
all the dying. This failing life need not be further troubled by using 
extraordinary means to prolong it. It is most commendable for 
parents to wish to donate the organs of an anencephalic child for 
transplants that may assist other children, but this may never be 
permitted before the donor child is certainly dead.
This reasoning would apply to other infants with congenital conditions 
that are generally fatal within the first month of life, such as Meckel- 
Gruber syndrome, various chromosomal abnormalities, Potter syndrome, 
and Trisomies 13 and 18. For conditions such as Tay-Sachs disease, in 
which symptom onset is later, reasonable medical treatment would be 
indicated, following Directives 57 and 58.
Palliative Care
Catholic teaching on conditions “incompatible with life” signals the 
importance of palliative care in the neonatal context. Palliative care in the 
neonatal or perinatal setting remains a growing edge of this important 
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movement within medicine. Ideally, palliative medicine should become a 
norm in the neonatal context, insofar as new developments in palliative 
medicine reject the former distinction between “doing everything” for the 
patient and “doing nothing but pain management” (hospice). Palliative 
medicine, as it is now understood, has expanded beyond only end-of-life 
care to the holistic treatment of all patients with life-threatening or 
chronic diseases.38
The World Health Organization (WHO) definition of palliative care 
captures its many dimensions.39 Recently, the WHO has further 
articulated what palliative medicine means specifically in the care of 
children, noting:
Palliative care for children represents a special, albeit closely 
related field to adult palliative care. WHO’s definition of palliative 
care appropriate for children and their families is as follows; the 
principles apply to other paediatric chronic disorders:
• Palliative care for children is the active total care of the child’s body, 
mind and spirit, and also involves giving support to the family.
• It begins when illness is diagnosed, and continues regardless of 
whether or not a child receives treatment directed at the disease.
• Health providers must evaluate and alleviate a child’s physical, 
psychological, and social distress.
• Effective palliative care requires a broad multidisciplinary approach 
that includes the family and makes use of available community 
resources; it can be successfully implemented even if resources are 
limited.
• It can be provided in tertiary care facilities, in community health 
centres and even in children’s homes.40
Thus, consistent with the broader field, palliative care in the neonatal 
context should be provided to all neonatal patients; it does not signal that 
the patient is necessarily terminal and entails equally care for the 
patient’s family.
Out of concerns about euthanasia and the culture of death, some within 
the Catholic tradition have been slow to accept the validity of palliative 
care in general.41 Yet, many Catholic hospitals have been leading the way 
in implementing palliative care, given its deep resonance with the best of 
the Catholic tradition,42 and Catholic magisterial writings have recently 
affirmed the importance of palliative care. As the Catechism notes:
Even if death is thought imminent, the ordinary care owed to a sick 
person cannot be legitimately interrupted. The use of painkillers to 
alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening 
their days, can be morally in conformity with human dignity if death 
is not willed as either an end or a means, but only foreseen and 
Catholicism and the Neonatal Context
Page 18 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD MEDICINE ONLINE (www.oxfordmedicine.com). © Oxford 
University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Medicine Online for 
personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: UC - Irvine; date: 31 August 2020
tolerated as inevitable. Palliative care is a special form of 
disinterested charity. As such it should be encouraged.43
Similarly, the work of Pope-Emeritus Benedict XVI highlights the 
convergence between the WHO definition of palliative care and the 
Catholic tradition. Benedict names palliative care as “a right belonging to 
every human being, one which we must all be committed to defend.”44 He 
sees it as providing “integral care, offering the sick the human assistance 
and spiritual accompaniment they need.”45 And he understands palliative 
care as a medical practice inextricably tied to spiritual accompaniment.46
Catholic parents facing the shock of the NICU may be unfamiliar with the 
practice of neonatal palliative care. They should be counseled that it is 
deeply consistent with the Catholic tradition.
Care for the Dead: Burial, Autopsies, and Organ Donation
A brief word about Catholic teaching regarding care for the dead is worth 
including here. As noted previously, the protection and promotion of the 
dignity of neonatal patients is central to the Catholic tradition. At all 
times, the bodies of such patients—perinatal, living, dying, or dead— 
should be treated with the respect accorded all human persons. Roman 
Catholic canon law recommends that the remains of deceased persons be 
buried, although cremation is not prohibited.47 The Catechism teaches 
that the bodies of the dead must be treated with respect and charity, 
noting the burial of the dead as one of the corporal works of mercy.48 
Such respectful treatment extends to fetal remains, whether the result of 
intentional abortion, miscarriage, or some other form of premature fetal 
demise. As Catholic ethicist Ron Hamel makes clear, fetal remains should 
never be considered or treated merely as medical waste.49 In addition, as 
he notes:
Also of great importance is the pastoral care of the parents who 
have experienced a tragic loss. As part of this care, parents should 
normally be the ones to arrange for the disposition of the remains 
of their fetus. If, for some reason, the parents are not able to do 
this, the hospital should then arrange for disposition, carefully 
informing the family of the hospital’s procedures and ensuring that 
the family is comfortable with them.50
Hamel also provides a model policy on how to deal with fetal demise due 
to miscarriage or stillbirth.51
A related question is that of autopsy. Especially in complex neonatal 
cases, an autopsy may be warranted to determine an actual cause of 
death, or a particular infant may help advance the scientific 
understanding of her or his specific condition. Again, autopsies, 
respectfully done, are consistent with Catholic teaching. As the Catechism 
states: “Autopsies can be morally permitted for legal inquests or scientific 
research.”52
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Equally, organ donation and transplantation are supported by Catholic 
teaching. This is noted in both the Catechism (§2301) and the ERDs:
Catholic health care institutions should encourage and provide the 
means whereby those who wish to do so may arrange for the 
donation of their organs and bodily tissue, for ethically legitimate 
purposes, so that they may be used for donation and research after 
death.
Such organs should not be removed until it has been medically 
determined that the patient has died. In order to prevent any 
conflict of interest, the physician who determines death should not 
be a member of the transplant team.
The use of tissue or organs from an infant may be permitted after 
death has been determined and with the informed consent of the 
parents or guardians.53
Thus, although autopsies and organ donation may not be the norm in 
most neonatal contexts, the Catholic tradition finds both to be acceptable 
practices as long as parental consent is obtained and the deceased infant 
is treated with the respect accorded a person with dignity.
Catholic Practices and Neonatal Care
While the teachings of the Catholic tradition shape many 
Catholic patients and families as they face medical crises, it is the case 
that, frequently, many Catholics are not familiar with the intricacies and 
nuances of Catholic teaching. Most Catholics, however, even—and 
sometimes, especially—lapsed Catholics are deeply familiar with the 
sacraments and sacramental practices of the Catholic tradition. These 
practices, often learned at a young age and learned in embodied and 
community-based ways over a lifetime, can have a more powerful effect 
on Catholic patients and families. How parents proceed with regard to 
medical decisions surrounding their infant children may, in the end, not 
be a matter so much of what is to be done medically but how it is done— 
not so much a matter of what decision is made but how they and their 
children are treated by the hospital and staff.
Practices and gestures that recognize parents and children as valued, 
relational beings are critical. And the ability for families to incorporate 
religious practices into the care of their imperiled children should be 
encouraged. Not only is this a matter of good patient care, but also 
allowing families to embed their children and the issues raised in their 
care in a larger framework shaped by ritual and sacrament may facilitate 
decision-making processes. In the final sections of this chapter, I would 
like to briefly discuss four key Catholic practices relevant to the neonatal 
context: baptism, anointing of the sick, prayers and blessings, and 
practices surrounding bereavement and funerals.
Catholicism and the Neonatal Context
Page 20 of 28
PRINTED FROM OXFORD MEDICINE ONLINE (www.oxfordmedicine.com). © Oxford 
University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Medicine Online for 
personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: UC - Irvine; date: 31 August 2020
Baptism
The Catholic tradition endorses general good practice: that parents’ 
understanding of their neonates as their children, as members of their 
family, as small persons with dignity requiring love and care should be 
recognized and nurtured at all times by healthcare staff. As with full-term 
healthy babies, parents should at all times and places be supported in 
their requests to see and hold and be present with their baby and should 
be offered opportunities to create identities and memories, even in the 
NICU. The bodies of babies—living or dead—should be treated with 
respect at all times.
More specifically, the Catholic tradition provides specific resources to 
families that if done well can help parents form their consciences. 
Baptism, for example, is an appropriate practice for all live-born babies, 
regardless of age, birth weight, or medical condition. Baptism affirms the 
sanctity and dignity of the infant—inviting the child into full membership 
in the Church regardless of illness or disability. But it also affirms the 
reality of death—for in baptism, Christians are baptized into the death of 
Christ. Granted, this is not usually emphasized during most baptismal 
ceremonies, but when performed well, the rite should equally emphasize 
reality and hope and should provide a spiritual and conceptual framework 
for the possibility that their child may be overmastered by their condition. 
When a priest or deacon is not available, anyone (even a nonbaptized 
person) may baptize with the consent of the parents.54
The issue of baptism for children who are stillborn or have died is a 
sensitive one. Canonically, the Catholic Church prohibits the baptism of 
those who have already died. For parents who wish baptism for their 
deceased child, a sensitive medical and pastoral staff should craft a 
middle ground event that encompasses all parties—including, perhaps, 
but not limited to, renewal of baptismal promises for the parents, the 
blessing and commendation of the child, and the blessing and 
commendation of the healthcare staff.
Anointing of the Sick
The Sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick is another potential practice 
with application to the neonatal context. Thoroughly revised after the 
Second Vatican Council forty years ago, the new understanding of the 
Sacrament of Anointing of the Sick (formerly Extreme Unction, which was 
reserved only for the dying) sees the rite as one for the sick. It entails 
anointing with blessed oil and laying on of hands together with prayers 
for healing and strength. In many ways, the practice of the Sacrament is 
in flux. Again, the Canon Law of the Church limits the Sacrament of 
Anointing to those baptized Catholics, gravely ill, who have “reached the 
age of reason,” which is generally interpreted to be around six or seven 
years old. Other traditions akin to Roman Catholicism—including 
Orthodox Christianity and Eastern Catholic rites—do not have this 
limitation. And in pastoral practice, priests will often perform the 
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Sacrament for sick children and their families. In instances where a priest 
will not anoint a child, there are many prayers that can be drawn from 
the rite (formally entitled Pastoral Care of the Sick), and more general 
ceremonies of prayer and blessing for the child, family, and caregivers 
can be developed.55
Like baptism, the Sacrament of the Sick practiced in the neonatal context 
should help family discernment by not shying away from the realities of 
grave illness and the real possibility of death while also reminding 
parents and caregivers that grace will surround their child both in death 
and in life. Both baptism and anointing also value, in important ways, the 
bodies of neonates, affirming the goodness of their bodies, even with 
pain, disability, and multiple medical interventions.
Prayers and Blessings
At all times, making space for ongoing prayer and blessings in the NICU, 
for and with the babies and families, is deeply consistent with the 
Catholic tradition. Rosaries, prayer cards, pictures of Our Lady of 
Guadalupe—the myriad aspects of material, religious culture—can be 
deeply sustaining to parents navigating the often frightening, 
uncomfortable, and intimidating environment of the NICU. These are 
especially important for parents from immigrant or ethnic communities 
for whom the US hospital may be particularly foreign and frightening. 
The rite of the Pastoral Care for the Sick includes a number of prayers 
and blessings for the sick, including a Blessing for Sick Children, which 
can be used by anyone at any time a blessing seems called for.56
Bereavement and Funerals
Attending to bereavement and mourning for parents who experience the 
death of a child in the neonatal context is extremely important. Many 
studies report that parents who experience perinatal death—late-term 
pregnancy loss, stillbirth, or infant death within the first month—find 
themselves bereft of many of the usual material social supports that 
normally would be provided to individuals in the case of a “real” birth or 
death.57 Portraits of the ways that healthcare professional behave in 
instances of perinatal death are often quite unflattering.
In cases of perinatal death, the treatment of parents, the babies’ bodies, 
and the parent–child bond should be attended to very intentionally. Again, 
parents should be supported in their requests to hold their dead child. 
Babies should not be taken to the mortuary until the parents are ready. 
Parents should be supported in their wish to take the baby home with 
them and to arrange for funeral services.
Pastoral ministers will find many resources in the Order of Christian 
Funerals, particularly Part II, “Funeral Rites for Children.”58 Some rites 
can be celebrated in the hospital or in the family home even if the child’s 
body is not present—including “Prayers after Death,” “Gathering in the 
Presence of the Body,” or “Order for Blessing of Parents after a 
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Miscarriage.” Particularly suited to stillbirths and infants who have died 
soon after birth is the “Rite of Final Commendation for an Infant.”59 It can 
be celebrated in the hospital with or without the presence of the child and 
can be adapted to suit the particular needs of the family.
The public, communal character of Catholic liturgical rites is best 
respected when family, friends, and hospital staff are invited to 
participate both in rituals performed in the hospital and those performed 
in parishes. Such public acknowledgment can help address complications 
of perinatal grieving. The importance of the presence of members of the 
healthcare team at these events cannot be overstated.
Conclusion
The Catholic tradition provides a rich array of convictions, 
tradition, and practices that have formed parents who will walk into 
hospital NICUs and that can help them make informed decisions about 
treatment options for their children. Catholics will inhabit this tradition 
differently—there is no question about that. Many Catholics do not know 
their own tradition very well, or some may misinterpret it. And although 
the Roman Catholic tradition provides a relatively clear framework for 
reasoning about utilizing or withholding treatment, the application of that 
framework to specific cases is always more of an art than a science—even 
for those who know the tradition well.
In the end, although so much more could be said, I hope this chapter has 
conveyed that Catholicism is a tradition with a deep commitment to each 
and every person, regardless of disability; that it is a tradition that values 
the exercise of reason within the context of faith and spirituality; and that 
through prayer and sacramental practice, it seeks to create and sustain 
communities of persons in body, mind, and spirit—communities that 
encompass not only infants and their parents but also the wider circle of 
healthcare providers and caregivers who find themselves thrown together 
—often by surprise, often by tragedy—in the neonatal context.
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